One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War

The reason I selected this title for my review is that is was VERY early in the morning before I put down this book. It is one of those rare books that you wish just went on and on because almost each page has a fresh revelation about the subject covered.

I do have a couple of problems with it though. One is that Mr. Dobbs seems to have a limited knowledge of aircraft and ships. For instance, airplanes don't have "steering columns" and ship speeds are not noted in "knots per hour."

Otherwise, this is a wonderful book, and a valuable resource for anyone wanting to know what happened during the Cuban missile crisis.

As I was reading this book, the chilling thought constantly occurred to me: what would W (or Cheney) have done. The answer to that question is what is so compelling about this book. Dobbs has some answers to this question in the afterword, which should not be skipped. Also, it turns out that Krushchev was a pragmatic man who was unwilling to risk nuclear war for the glory of the USSR (Russia). Looks like maybe Putin is no Krushchev either.

This book is an excellent piece of historical writing, well-documented and well-illustrated with pertinent maps and photographs. The author relies upon recently accessable material from Soviet and American archives, as well as interviews with personnel in America and Russia. Until Cuban archives are open, this work will be the last word on the topic. Most popular accounts seem to have been based on the "Excomm Tapes"; but these are replete with inaccuracies amd can be misleading. To be useful, they must be backed up with documentray sources. Without them, they can only be used to show the attitudes of the speakers. Alone they are not reliable for historical fact. Much of the earliest writing on the topic is from the "Canonical School of the Kennedys"; this analysis is well-balanced and gives JFK his fair due.

The title of this review is a quote from JFK that is somewhat similar to what Clausewitz described more eligently as "Operational Friction"; how in any compex military operation things start going awry. In the age of nuclear weapons it is even more dangerous. The chance for an accidental nuclear release were so numerous ("People you wouldn't trust with a loaded 22 rifle were flying around in single-seat aircraft with control over their nuclear weapons" as one speaker says) The "Afterwood" chapter is excellent with insights and is very useful to use as a classroom reading assignment.

Dobbs book succeeds in three important ways: First, it uncovers many previously unknown facts about the Cuban missile crisis. Some of these facts should change the way we view the crisis and the lessons we draw from it. Second, the book shows how chaotic the event were, how little the actors knew, and how the crisis took on a life of its own. This is quite sobering and not a little scary. Third, Dobbs tells the well-researched story as a journalist would, skipping between Washington DC, Havana, and Moscow, and half-a-dozen other places. This makes the book a very exciting and enjoyable page-turner. Two thumbs up!

Michael Dobbs gets you right into the Ex-Comm meetings with a dialog technique that makes you feel like a fly on the wall. He does this with Khruschev and Castro as well. As a naval aviator seving during the time frame of the crisis, some of the side stories made me feel like I was in the cockpit of one those RF-8's, U-2's or BUFF's. His descriptions were right on. I think I'll go back and read it again!